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FROM “PERSONAL AUTONOMY” TO 
“DEATH-ON-DEMAND”: WILL PURDY V. DPP 
LEGALIZE ASSISTED SUICIDE IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM? 
Carol C. Cleary* 
Abstract: Debates over end-of-life issues and the “right to die” are becom-
ing increasingly prevalent in many modern societies. In July 2009 the 
House of Lords addressed the question of whether the legal framework 
governing assisted suicide in the United Kingdom constitutes an unjusti-
fiable infringement on privacy rights. The court decided that question in 
the affirmative, and this Note discusses the implications of Purdy v. Director 
of Public Prosecutions for the legality of assisted suicide in the United King-
dom. This Note uses evidence of legal developments in other jurisdictions 
that have grounded the right to assisted suicide in personal autonomy to 
argue that the Purdy court’s reasoning and the Director of Public Prose-
cution’s response to the decision paves the way for a gradual breakdown 
in restrictions on the practice. 
Introduction 
 A recent movement to legalize assisted suicide and euthanasia has 
swept across some of the globe’s wealthier industrialized nations.1 
While a handful of jurisdictions in Europe and the United States have 
legalized assisted suicide with varying degrees of restriction, laws that 
allow the practice remain the exception rather than the rule in most of 
the developed world.2 The United Kingdom is one region in which ef-
forts to legalize assisted suicide have historically proven unsuccessful; 
under current U.K. law, suicide itself is not a crime, but aiding or abet-
ting someone else’s suicide is a criminal offense, the prosecution of 
                                                                                                                      
* The author is a Staff Member for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
1 Lara L. Manzione, Note, Is There a Right to Die?: A Comparative Study of Three Societies 
(Australia, Netherlands, United States), 30 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 443, 444 (2002). 
2 See generally Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the 
Democratic World: A Legal Overview, 16 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. 1 (2003) (discussing the legal ap-
proaches to assisted suicide and euthanasia around the world, and noting that the Nether-
lands and Belgium are the only countries in the liberal world that accept both practices). 
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which is left to the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP).3 The legality of the ban on assisted suicide and the scope of 
prosecutorial discretion have recently come under scrutiny, especially 
as British citizens have begun to take advantage of the more liberal sui-
cide laws in neighboring European countries like Switzerland.4 Switzer-
land is unique among jurisdictions that have legalized assisted suicide 
because Swiss law does not require that the person giving assistance be 
a physician, and there are no restrictions on foreigners who travel to 
the country merely to take advantage of its liberal assisted suicide provi-
sion.5 As a consequence of these legal idiosyncrasies, Switzerland has 
become a hotbed for what some have termed “death tourism,”6 and 
since 1998 over 100 British citizens are known to have traveled to the 
country to take their lives with the help of “right-to-die” centers.7 
 To date, no one in the United Kingdom has been prosecuted un-
der the Suicide Act for assisting in a suicide that takes place abroad.8 
The fact that the ban remains in place, however, has led some to seek 
clarification from the British government regarding how the DPP 
chooses whether or not to prosecute perpetrators of the Act.9 In July 
2009, the House of Lords ruled in Purdy v. Director of Public Prosecutions 
that the DPP must clarify which factors he would consider before decid-
ing whether a prosecution under the Suicide Act would be in the pub-
lic’s interest.10 The decision noted that, while it was not the place of the 
court to decriminalize assisted suicide, judges had a role to play in clari-
fying the law for cases in which “compassionate assistance” was re-
quired, i.e. where assistance was necessary to aid the terminally ill in 
ending their lives.11 The DPP issued draft guidelines in late September 
200912 and after a period of public comment issued final guidelines in 
                                                                                                                      
3 Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 60, §§ 1−2 (Eng.). 
4 See Purdy v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions [2009] UKHL 45, [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403, 414 (U.K.); 
see also Rohith Srinivas, Note, Exploring the Potential for American Death Tourism, 13 Mich. St. U. 
J. Med. & L. 91, 111–12 (2009). 
5 Srinivas, supra note 4, at 106−07. 
6 See id. at 105, 107. 
7 See John F. Burns, With Help, Conductor and Wife Ended Lives, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2009, 
at A4. 
8 Id. 
9 See Purdy, 3 W.L.R. at 414; see also Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 1 (2002). 
10 See Purdy, 3 W.L.R. at 414. 
11 See id. at 413, 423. 
12 Mark Hennessy & Gerry Moriarty, New Guidelines on Assisted Suicide Published in UK, 
Irish Times, Sept. 24, 2009, at 13, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/ 
2009/0924/1224255131933.html. 
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late February 2010.13 The policy includes sixteen factors that weigh in 
favor of prosecution, and six factors that weigh against prosecution.14 
 Upon issuing the draft guidelines, the DPP stated that his policy 
guidelines are not intended to undermine the force of the Suicide Act, 
and that no person is immune from prosecution.15 Almost immediately, 
however, the list generated controversy; some accused the DPP of 
usurping the role of Parliament and granting de facto immunity to cer-
tain classes of persons, while others hailed the guidelines as a step to-
wards “greater patient choice.”16 The DPP’s initial policy placed an em-
phasis on the physical status of the individual committing suicide; 
under that policy, evidence of terminal illness or physical disabilities 
weighed against prosecution.17 After a period of public comment, the 
DPP revised his guidelines to place greater emphasis on the motives of 
the assister rather than the health of the victim.18 The DPP reiterated 
that the policy was not intended to change the prohibition on assisted 
suicide,19 but the very existence of such a policy remains a source of 
debate among those with differing views about the practice of assisted 
suicide.20 Regardless of the probable effect of the DPP’s guidelines, the 
factors themselves reveal the complexities and nuances attendant to the 
assisted suicide debate, one that has become increasingly relevant to 
societies around the world.21 
 Part I of this Note provides a detailed overview of the “right-to-die” 
movement and the most recent jurisprudence on the issue of assisted 
suicide in the United Kingdom. Part II of the Note discusses this juris-
                                                                                                                      
13 See Press Release, Crown Prosecution Serv., DPP Issues Assisted Suicide Policy (Feb. 25, 
2010), http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/109_10/ [hereinafter CPS Press Release 
2/25/10]. 
14 See id. 
15 Frances Gibb, Assisted Suicide: DPP Unlikely to Prosecute Relatives Who Help, Times On-
line (London), Sept. 24, 2009, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/arti- 
cle6845582.ece. 
16 See id. 
17 Crown Prosecution Service, Interim Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of As-
sisted Suicide, http://cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_policy.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) 
[hereinafter Interim Policy for Prosecutors]. 
18 See CPS Press Release 2/25/10, supra note 13. 
19 See id. 
20 See Haroon Sidique, DPP Releases Assisted Suicide Guidelines, Guardian (U.K.), Feb. 25, 
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/feb/25/dpp-releases-assisted-suicide-guidelines. 
21 See Gibb, supra note 15; David Maddox, Half of Britons Want Assisted Suicide to Be Made 
Legal, Scotsman (Edinburgh), Sept. 15, 2009, at 6, available at http://news.scotsman.com/ 
euthanasia/half-of-britons-want-assisted.5646125.jp; Stephen McGinty, Victory in Bid to Le-
galise Assisted Suicide, Scotsman (Edinburgh), July 31, 2009, at 1, available at http://news. 
scotsman.com/euthanasia/victory-in-bid-to-legalise.5511527.jp. 
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prudence, as well as the DPP’s guidelines, in more detail. Finally, Part 
III presents the argument that the Purdy court’s desire to carve out a de 
facto exception to the Suicide Act for individuals with terminal illnesses 
and/or disabilities is at odds with its holding that the decision to com-
mit suicide is a matter of personal autonomy. This Note further argues 
that by premising the right to kill oneself on notions of privacy and per-
sonal autonomy, the Purdy decision is likely to set the United Kingdom 
down a path towards relaxation of the assisted suicide ban and eventual 
legalization of the practice. Recent developments prove that the DPP 
cannot issue guidelines that draw a line between individuals with ter-
minal illnesses or incurable disabilities and others who make rational 
decisions to end their own lives without articulating some kind of ra-
tionale that places relative worth on individual lives vis-à-vis the state. 
I. Background 
A. The “Right to Die” 
 The concept of a “right to die” has its theoretical basis in the idea 
that an individual should be able to decide the time and manner of his 
or her own death, either by herself or with the aid of another if she so 
chooses.22 The right to die encompasses the right of an individual to 
commit suicide with or without assistance, as well as the right to request 
that another person commit acts that cause the death of the requesting 
party, or “voluntary euthanasia.”23 Voluntary euthanasia can be either 
“passive,” when a doctor or other actor refrains from performing acts 
that prolong an individual’s life, or “active,” when a doctor or some other 
actor acts to cause the death of another, e.g. by injecting a lethal medica-
tion.24 The distinction between assisted suicide and euthanasia thus rests 
on who actually carries out the act that ends the individual’s life.25 
 Euthanasia remains a crime in most countries of the world.26 As-
sisted suicide is currently legal in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Swit-
zerland,27 and in the U.S. states of Oregon, and Washington.28 Of these 
                                                                                                                      
22 Manzione, supra note 1, at 445. 
23 See Srinivas, supra note 4, at 94. 
24 See John Griffiths et al., Euthanasia & Law in the Netherlands 51 (1998); 
Cohen-Almagor, supra note 2, at 2−3. 
25 See Srinivas, supra note 4, at 94. 
26 Cohen-Almagor, supra note 2, at 5. 
27 The Fight for the Right to Die, CBC News, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/ 
story/2009/02/09/f-assisted-suicide.html. 
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jurisdictions, the Netherlands is considered to have the most liberal 
“right-to-die” laws, which permit euthanasia as well as assisted suicide.29 
Though euthanasia is illegal in Switzerland, that nation also has a 
unique legal position on assisted suicide, a practice it has permitted 
since 1918.30 Swiss law allows lay persons as well as doctors to assist in the 
suicide of others, so long as the person assisting does not act with selfish 
intent; the law also does not require that persons seeking assistance be 
terminally ill.31 
  A number of “right to die” organizations have sprung up in Swit-
zerland to facilitate assisted suicide.32 One such organization, called 
“Dignitas,” does not discriminate against non-residents who travel to 
Switzerland to use its services.33 As a result, individuals from other na-
tions where assisted suicide is illegal have begun to travel to Switzerland 
to end their lives, a phenomenon known as “death tourism.”34 In the 
past several years, over 100 British citizens have taken advantage of 
Dignitas’ services, igniting the right to die debate in the United King-
dom.35 Individuals seeking assistance in suicide, and those who seek to 
help them, are calling for a reform of the nation’s assisted suicide law,36 
while supporters of the ban argue that the law is necessary to protect 
vulnerable individuals who might be pressured into taking their own 
lives if assisted suicide were legalized.37 
B. The Suicide Act, Prosecutorial Discretion & the Right to Privacy— 
Controversy in the United Kingdom 
 Suicide and attempted suicide ceased to be crimes in the United 
Kingdom when the Suicide Act was passed in 1961.38 The statute also 
created a new offense in section 2(1), which stipulates that any person 
who “aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another, or an at-
                                                                                                                      
28 William Yardley, First Death for Washington Assisted-Suicide Law, N.Y. Times, May 23, 
2009, at A10. 
29 See Cohen-Almagor, supra note 2, at 5−6. 
30 See Srinivas, supra note 4, at 105−06. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. at 106. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. at 92−93. 
35 See id. 
36 See Srinivas, supra note 4, at 92. 
37 See A.N. Wilson, I Still Wake Up at Night, Wishing I Had Killed My Mother. But Keir Starmer 
Is Wrong, Daily Mail (London), Sept. 24, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article- 
1215710/a-n-wilson-i-wake-night-wishing-i-killed-mother-but-keir-starmer-wrong.html. 
38 Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 60, § 1 (Eng.). 
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tempt by another to commit suicide” is liable on conviction to serve up 
to fourteen years in prison.39 Thus, under the Suicide Act, it is consid-
ered a crime to assist another person in a non-crime.40 Pursuant to sec-
tion 2(4), however, no prosecutions may be brought for an offense un-
der section 2 except by or with the consent of the DPP.41 
 As the head of the Crown Prosecution Service, the DPP prosecutes 
criminal cases that the police of England and Wales have investigated.42 
The basic reason for including a provision in a statute limiting the ini-
tiation of prosecutions is to prevent inappropriate prosecutions for ac-
tions that may fall under the scope of the statute.43 In general, the DPP 
will only bring a prosecution under a criminal statute when he deems it 
to be in the public interest.44 The DPP and his agents, in the form of 
Crown prosecutors, determine whether a prosecution is in the public 
interest by reference to a set of factors published in the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors (the Code).45 The Code, which the DPP issues and makes 
available to the public, applies to all criminal offenses and does not dis-
tinguish among different crimes.46 
 The DPP’s role in the prosecution of crimes is at the heart of recent 
challenges to the legality of the Suicide Act; however, these cases are also 
unique because the litigants have argued that the ban on assisted suicide 
                                                                                                                      
39 Id. § 2(1). 
40 See id. §§ 1−2. 
41 Id. § 2(4). 
42 See Crown Prosecution Service, About the CPS: Director of Public Prosecutions, 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/about/dpp.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2010); Crown Prosecution Ser-
vice, People at the CPS: The Crown Prosecution Service, http://www.cps.gov.uk/about/ 
people.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2010). 
43 See Purdy v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions [2009] UKHL 45, [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403, 419 (U.K.). 
Other reasons to include a provision for limiting prosecutions are: 
[T]o secure consistency of practice, to prevent abuse of the kind that might 
otherwise result in vexatious private prosecution, to enable account to be tak-
en of mitigating factors and to provide some central control of the use of the 
criminal law where it has to intrude into areas which are particularly sensitive 
or controversial. 
See id. at 419−20. 
44 See id. at 420. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. The Code sets out two tests which prosecutors typically use to determine 
whether or not to proceed with a prosecution—the “Threshold Test” which is used at a 
very early stage in the investigation, and the “Full Code Test,” which entails consideration 
of the evidence followed by consideration of whether a prosecution is needed in the public 
interest. See id. 
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constitutes an intrusion into their right to privacy.47 For example, in Pret-
ty v. United Kingdom, plaintiff Diane Pretty sued the United Kingdom in 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) after the DPP refused to 
grant her husband advance immunity for his anticipated assistance in 
her suicide.48 Pretty, who suffered from a motor neuron disease, claimed 
that the blanket ban on assisted suicide prevented her from exercising 
her lawful right to end her life because her deteriorating physical condi-
tion rendered her incapable of performing the act without assistance.49 
Pretty sought a guarantee from the DPP that he would not prosecute 
her husband if he were to assist her in committing suicide.50 The court 
concluded, for the first time ever, that the right to privacy guaranteed by 
Article 8(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights (Conven-
tion) encompasses the right to make the decision to end one’s own 
life.51 The court held, however, that the DPP did not act inappropriately 
by refusing to grant advance immunity for Pretty’s husband.52 The court 
reasoned that it could be construed as a threat to the rule of law if the 
government were to exempt individuals or classes of individuals from 
the operation of the law, and that the gravity of assisting in someone 
else’s suicide was serious enough that the DPP’s refusal to acquiesce in 
Pretty’s request was not unreasonable.53 
 In Purdy v. DPP, plaintiff Debbie Purdy sought judicial review of the 
DPP’s actions after he refused to publish detailed guidelines regarding 
the factors he would consider before deciding whether or not to prose-
cute an individual under the Suicide Act.54 Owing to her primary pro-
gressive multiple sclerosis, Purdy foresaw a time when she would regard 
her continuing existence as unbearable, and she would wish to commit 
suicide.55 She anticipated, however, that by the time she reached that 
stage of her disease she would be unable to act without assistance and 
would need to travel to a country where assisted suicide was lawful.56 
Purdy argued it was an injustice that the law was so unclear that she 
could not be sure whether her husband would be prosecuted for assist-
                                                                                                                      
47 See id. at 415−16; Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 
14 (2002). 
48 See Pretty, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 6−7. 
49 See id. at 6. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. at 36–37. 
52 See id. at 39. 
53 See id. 
54 See Purdy, 3 W.L.R. at 414. 
55 See id. at 409. 
56 Id. 
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ing her in traveling to another country to commit suicide.57 As a conse-
quence, Purdy argued, she would have to commit suicide sooner than 
she would like while she was still well enough to do so by herself, rather 
than subject her husband to possible prosecution.58 
 First, the Purdy court followed Pretty in ruling that Article 8(1) en-
compasses the right to “self-determination,” which itself includes the 
right to make the decision to kill oneself.59 The court then held that the 
public interest factors set out in the current version of the Code were 
not applicable to the complex issues presented by assisted suicide cas-
es.60 Finally, the court ordered the DPP to issue an offense-specific policy 
identifying the facts and the circumstances that would be considered 
when deciding whether to prosecute individuals under the Suicide 
Act.61 Pursuant to this ruling, the DPP issued interim guidelines on Sep-
tember 23, 2009.62 These guidelines were left open for public comment 
until December 16, 2009, and the DPP issued his final policy on Febru-
ary 25, 2010.63 
II. Discussion 
 The Purdy court’s recognition that Article 8(1) guarantees the 
right to self-determination was foundational to the court’s ultimate 
holding requiring the DPP to issue an offense-specific policy directing 
prosecutorial discretion in cases of assisted suicide.64 Article 8(1) of the 
Convention stipulates that all individuals have the right to respect for 
their private and family life.65 Under Article 8(2), public authorities 
may not interfere with this right unless the interference is in accor-
dance with the law, has an aim which is legitimate, and is necessary in a 
democratic society for that legitimate aim.66 
                                                                                                                      
57 See id. at 413−14. 
58 See id. at 414. 
59 See id. at 416−17, 431. 
60 See Purdy, 3 W.L.R. at 423. 
61 Id. 
62 See Gibb, supra note 15. 
63 CPS Press Release 2/25/10, supra note 13; Press Release, Crown Prosecution Serv., 
DPP Publishes Interim Policy on Prosecuting Assisted Suicide (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www. 
cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/144_09/. 
64 See Purdy v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions [2009] UKHL 45, [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403, 416−17, 
431 (U.K.). 
65 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 8(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
66 See Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 37 (2002); see 
also ECHR, supra note 65, art. 8(2) (listing “national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, [for] the prevention of disorder or crime, [for] the protection 
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 To meet the requirement of being “in accordance with the law,” 
any intrusion must be clearly authorized by law and precise enough for 
an individual to understand the law’s scope and foresee its conse-
quences so that he or she may regulate his or her conduct accord-
ingly.67 Purdy claimed that the Suicide Act did not meet this require-
ment because she did not understand how to conform her actions to 
avoid subjecting her husband to prosecution.68 This uncertainty re-
sulted from the fact that the Suicide Act’s ban on assisted suicide did 
not allow for any exceptions, yet simultaneously provided for broad 
prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement.69 Thus, Purdy’s husband’s 
fate was wholly dependent upon the DPP’s interpretation of factors in 
the Code inapplicable to unique situations like hers.70 Purdy argued, 
and the court accepted, that because the Suicide Act as formulated, 
taken together with the Code, did not meet the requisite level of acces-
sibility and foreseeability required by Article 8(2) of the Convention, it 
constituted an unjustifiable interference with her right to privacy in 
violation of the Convention.71 
 In determining that Purdy’s right to privacy includes the right to 
make the decision to kill herself, the House of Lords emphasized that 
Article 8(1) relates to the manner in which a person lives his or her life, 
and that how a person chooses to spend the closing moments of his or 
her life is part of the act of living and therefore should be respected.72 
The Purdy court relied on reasoning in Pretty v. U.K., in which the 
ECHR noted that when the law prevents an individual from exercising 
choices that affect her quality of life, as when she decides to avoid “what 
she considers will be an undignified and distressing end to her life,” 
this constitutes an interference with her right to privacy.73 
                                                                                                                      
of health or morals, or [for] the protection of rights and freedoms of others” as legitimate 
aims). 
67 See Purdy, 3 W.L.R. at 417. 
68 See id. at 414. 
69 See id. at 418. 
70 See id. at 423. Some of the factors listed in the Code which weigh in favor of prosecu-
tion include the seriousness of the offense, the seriousness of the sentence upon convic-
tion, whether or not a weapon was used, whether or not the offense was committed against 
a person serving the public, whether or not the offense was premeditated, and whether or 
not the defendant was in a position of authority or trust, among others. See Crown Prose-
cution Service, The Code for Crown Prosecutors § 5.9(a),(c)–(e) (2004), available at 
http://cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/code2004english.pdf. 
71 See Purdy, 3 W.L.R. at 422. 
72 See id. at 416. 
73 See id. at 416−17; Pretty, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 37. 
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 After concluding that Purdy’s Article 8(1) rights were implicated by 
the Suicide Act, the Law Lords examined the factors in the Code that 
the DPP customarily uses to determine whether a prosecution is in the 
public interest.74 Lord Hope noted that while the Code normally pro-
vides sufficient guidance to Crown Prosecutors,75 it fails to do so in cases 
involving the assisted suicide “of a person who is terminally ill or severely 
and incurably disabled,” and who, “having the capacity to take such a 
decision, does so freely and with a full understanding of the conse-
quences.”76 Lord Hope also noted the clear disconnect between the text 
of the Suicide Act and the manner of its application in “compassionate” 
cases like Purdy’s.77 Furthermore, although the relatively small number 
of these “controversial” cases would undoubtedly grow, Lord Hope con-
cluded that the DPP could likely define the class that would require 
“special treatment” narrowly.78 Similarly, Baroness Hale wrote that there 
could be individual cases in which “the deterrent effect of a prosecution 
would be a disproportionate interference with the autonomy of the per-
son who wishes to end her life.”79 Accordingly, Hale concluded, any law 
that interferes with this decision must be formulated to protect an indi-
vidual’s right to make a “genuinely autonomous choice.”80 In sum, an 
offense-specific policy for prosecutorial discretion under the Suicide Act 
was deemed necessary because there would otherwise be an inappropri-
ate infringement on the right of autonomous individuals to make the 
decision to end their lives.81 
 The final guidelines that the DPP issued on February 25, 2010 are 
an attempt to satisfy the Law Lords’ directive, and upon their release, 
the current DPP, Keir Starmer, noted that “only Parliament can change 
the law,” that he is unable to assure a person in advance of committing 
a crime that he will not bring a prosecution, and that no one should 
take his policy as any kind of assurance against charges.82 The policy 
applies when the acts that constitute assistance are committed in Eng-
land and Wales, regardless of where the suicide or attempted suicide 
                                                                                                                      
74 See Purdy, 3 W.L.R. at 420−23. 
75 See id. at 422. 
76 See id. at 423. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. at 425. 
80 See Purdy, 3 W.L.R. at 426. 
81 See id. at 423, 426. 
82 Crown Prosecution Service, Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encourag-
ing or Assisting Suicide, Feb. 2010, http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assis- 
ted_suicide_policy.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Policy for Prosecutors]. 
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actually occurs.83 Thus, the policy is clearly intended to cover instances 
of death tourism as well as suicides in England and Wales.84 
 The DPP’s policy lists sixteen factors that weigh in favor of prosecu-
tion and six that weigh against prosecution.85 The factors that weigh in 
favor of prosecution include that: the victim did not have the capacity to 
reach an informed decision to commit suicide; the victim had not 
reached a “voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to commit 
suicide;” the victim had not clearly communicated his or her decision to 
commit suicide; the victim did not seek the assistance of the suspect on 
his or her own initiative; the suspect “was not wholly motivated by com-
passion,” was motivated by the prospect of financial gain, or was paid by 
the victim for his or her assistance; the suspect pressured the victim to 
commit suicide; and the victim was physically able to undertake the act 
that constituted the assistance him or herself, among others.86 
 The six factors that weigh against a prosecution are that: the victim 
had reached a clear, settled, voluntary, and informed decision to com-
mit suicide; the suspect was entirely motivated by compassion; the ac-
tions of the suspect were “of only minor encouragement or assistance;” 
the suspect had sought to dissuade the victim from committing suicide; 
the suspect’s actions constituted “reluctant encouragement or assis-
tance” in the face of the victim’s determined wish to commit suicide; 
and the suspect reported the suicide to the police and fully cooperated 
in any investigation into the circumstances of the victim’s death.87 
III. Analysis 
A. An Exception to the Ban 
 The DPP’s final guidelines clearly emphasize the victim’s auton-
omy in the prosecutorial analysis, and the policy disfavors prosecution 
in cases in which an individual has made a rational, autonomous, inde-
                                                                                                                      
83 Id. 
84 See id. In setting out the factors for/against prosecution the DPP noted that deter-
mining whether a prosecution is in the public interest “is not simply a matter of adding up 
the number of factors on each side and seeing which side has the greater number,” and 
that each case must be decided on its own facts. Id. He also notes that “[i]t is quite possible 
that one factor alone may outweigh a number of other factors which tend in the opposite 
direction.” Id. 
85 See id. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
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pendent decision to end his or her own life.88 These guidelines are 
consistent with the Purdy court’s stated intention to respect the auton-
omy of individuals in Purdy’s situation.89 
 The Purdy court’s apparent desire, however, to carve out an excep-
tion to the Suicide Act for an individual suffering from a terminal ill-
ness or disability who wishes to make the decision to end his or her own 
life90 is inconsistent with the premise of the court’s directive to the DPP, 
a premise that is based on the principle of self-determination.91 If Purdy 
v. DPP stands in part for the proposition that the right to privacy pro-
tects an individual’s ability to make autonomous choices regarding the 
quality of his or her life, including even the choice to end that life,92 
then any prosecutorial guidelines which by their content purport to 
respect this autonomy must exclude any qualifying factors regarding an 
individual’s physical condition; thus, there is a tension between protect-
ing personal autonomy and stipulating when a person is suffering 
enough to end his or her own life.93 
 At least one of the Law Lords recognized this tension; for example, 
Baroness Hale noted in her opinion that if the court “is serious about 
protecting autonomy” then it must “accept that autonomous individu-
als have different views about what makes their lives worth living.”94 
Hale proceeded to note that though “[i]t is not for society to tell peo-
                                                                                                                      
88 See Policy for Prosecutors, supra note 82. For example, so long as a victim manifested 
a resolute, clear intention or “determined wish” to commit suicide, and the decision was 
made independently and without pressure from outside sources, then a majority of the 
factors disfavoring prosecution would be satisfied, and six of the factors favoring prosecu-
tion would be negated. See id. 
89 See Purdy v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions [2009] UKHL 45, [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403, 426 (U.K.). 
90 See id. at 422−23. The court’s desire to carve out an exception for individuals with 
terminal illnesses can be inferred ipso facto from the Purdy court’s directive to the DPP, 
which is premised on the holding that the original Code was inapplicable to cases of com-
petent individuals who suffered from terminal illnesses, and who, as such, deserved special 
consideration under the law. See id. 
91 See id. at 426; see also Neil M. Gorsuch, The Future of Assisted Suicide and Eu-
thanasia 99 (2006). As Gorsuch points out, an assisted suicide regime wherein the indi-
vidual is required not only to make a rational, autonomous choice, but also to meet some 
sort of benchmark requirement of terminal illness or suffering is inconsistent in its appli-
cation because, while it “would advance the autonomy interests of some persons,” it would 
not respect the autonomy interests of others. Gorsuch, supra, at 96. This requirement 
would suppress many of what Gorsuch calls “rational, autonomous . . . decisions to die.” Id. 
Thus, in order to comport fully with principles of autonomy, a state arguably must “abstain 
from coercively interfering with any rational adult’s private decision to die, whatever the 
motive or reason for the individual’s considered decision.” See id. at 98. 
92 See Purdy, 3 W.L.R. at 416−17. 
93 See Gorsuch, supra note 91, at 96, 98−99. 
94 See Purdy, 3 W.L.R. at 426. 
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ple what to value about their own lives,” at times it “may be justifiable 
for society to insist that we value their lives even if they do not.”95 The 
court has not provided any rationale for distinguishing between lives 
society must “insist” upon valuing versus those which society has less 
interest in protecting.96 Consequently, as it stands, the court’s “self-
determination” rationale for implicating privacy rights in the decision 
to commit suicide leaves a gaping hole wherein any autonomous indi-
vidual should, under the court’s logic, be able to pass judgment on the 
subjective quality of his or her own life and act accordingly.97 
 The reaction to the DPP’s first attempt at formulating a policy for 
assisted suicide cases illustrates the line-drawing problem presented by 
the Purdy decision.98 The September guidelines, which took account of 
the physical situation of the victim and clearly disfavored prosecution in 
cases in which the individual was terminally ill or disabled and was 
helped to die by a family member or close friend,99 were criticized on 
the grounds that the policy amounted to a statement that certain kinds 
of life were entitled to less protection from the state.100 Therefore, by 
emphasizing autonomy and self-determination as the bases for the 
right to make a decision to end one’s own life, the Purdy court has in-
                                                                                                                      
95 See id. at 426−27. 
96 See id. at 427. Baroness Hale raised the question of how it should be determined 
when “the law is justified in interfering with a genuinely autonomous choice” but did not 
provide any answers, instead expressing her hope that the DPP’s policy would include 
qualifying factors pertaining to the “reasons why the person . . . wished to be helped to end 
his or her life.” See id. 
97 See id. at 426−27; see also Gorsuch, supra note 91, at 98−99; Daniel Callahan, Reason, 
Self-determination, and Physician-Assisted Suicide, in The Case Against Assisted Suicide 52, 
61−62 (Kathleen Foley & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002). During the Parliamentary debates in 
July 2009, when a proposal to create an exception to the Suicide Act for terminally ill indi-
viduals who traveled abroad to take their lives was defeated, some lawmakers expressed con-
cern that “any proposal to alter the current position involves a judgment that a certain kind 
of life, or a certain span of life, has become unworthy of support.” See David Aaronovitch, It’s 
My Life and I Demand to End It When I Want, Times (London), Sept. 22, 2009, http://www. 
timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/david_aaronovitch/article6843426.ece. 
98 See Editorial, Assisted Suicide: Right-to-Die Laws Are a Matter for Parliament, Telegraph 
(U.K.), Feb. 25, 2010, at 23, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-
view/7319183/Assisted-suicide-Right-to-die-laws-are-a-matter-for-Parliament.html (noting that 
representatives of terminally ill and disabled individuals had accused the DPP of sending a 
message through his interim policy that those lives were “second class”). 
99 See Interim Policy for Prosecutors, supra note 17. For example, in a case where an 
adult with a terminal illness indicated on her own initiative her clear wish to commit sui-
cide and requested the aid of a spouse or loved one in doing so, under the interim policy 
at least five of the seven most important factors weighing against prosecution would be 
satisfied, and four of the factors weighing in favor of prosecution would be negated; thus, a 
prosecution would very likely not follow. See id. 
100 See Editorial, supra note 98. 
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vited a situation in which it is very difficult for the state to articulate 
limits on this right without appearing disingenuous.101 
B. The Slippery Slope 
 The tension between individual autonomy and the state’s role in 
the “quality of life” analysis is the conventional starting point of “slippery 
slope” arguments that have historically been invoked to justify laws pro-
hibiting all forms of assisted suicide and/or euthanasia.102 Although 
such arguments are often over-stated, evidence from other jurisdictions 
that justify the practice of assisted suicide by appeals to personal auton-
omy or “quality of life” assessments reveals a legal trend wherein the cat-
egory of individuals deemed acceptable candidates for the procedure is 
gradually being widened.103 
 Recent developments in the Netherlands illustrate this gradual 
widening; in 1994, the Dutch Supreme Court squarely held in the Cha-
bot case that assistance in the suicide of an individual whose suffering is 
not physical and who is not terminally ill can be justified on necessity 
grounds because “the wish to die of a person whose suffering is psychic 
can be based on an autonomous judgment.”104 Seven years later, the 
                                                                                                                      
101 See Purdy, 3 W.L.R. at 426; Policy for Prosecutors, supra note 82; Editorial, supra note 
98. 
102 See Griffiths et al., supra note 24, at 177; Craig Paterson, Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia: A Natural Law Ethics Approach 173 (2008). For example, proponents of 
these arguments hold that euthanasia must be outlawed in all circumstances because when 
taken to its logical conclusion, a legal regime which allows the practice of euthanasia on 
the basis of personal autonomy has no argument against legalization in situations where a 
patient is not suffering, which the regime deems as unacceptable. See Griffiths et al., 
supra note 24, at 177. Griffiths takes issue with the logical slippery slope argument because 
the argument “presupposes that the forms of termination of life allegedly implied by le-
galization of euthanasia are obviously unacceptable.” See id. 
103 See, e.g., Gorsuch, supra note 91, at 105−06; Griffiths et al., supra note 24, at 
152−53; Paterson, supra note 102, at 176−78. For example, euthanasia and assisted suicide 
first became subjects of public debate in the Netherlands in the early 1970s, when a Dutch 
court indicated in the Postma decision that dispensing of pain relief that hastens a patient’s 
death can be acceptable when a patient is incurably ill, finds his suffering mentally or phys-
ically unbearable, has expressed the wish to die, and the person who accedes to the re-
quest is a doctor. See Griffiths et al., supra note 24, at 51−53. By 1986, a series of court 
decisions had established that “when a patient who is suffering unbearably and hopelessly 
makes a voluntary and well-considered request” to be euthanized or to be assisted in his or 
her own suicide, a doctor who responds to the request and conforms to “requirements of 
careful practice” would not be guilty of a crime. Id. at 73. Eventually, assisted suicide and 
euthanasia were legalized in 2001 without any express requirement that a patient be “in-
curably ill.” See Gorsuch, supra note 91, at 106. 
104 See Griffiths et al., supra note 24, at 80−82. In the wake of Chabot, John Griffiths, 
a professor of sociology of law at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands specu-
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Dutch Parliament actually legalized both practices; under the legisla-
tion doctors are primarily restricted by the requirements that the pa-
tient’s request be “voluntary and well-considered,” and that his or her 
suffering be “lasting and unbearable.”105 Terminal illness is not a re-
quirement for euthanasia or assisted suicide, and neither is a physical 
ailment of any kind; the “suffering” referenced in the bill is completely 
subjective, and to meet this requirement, a doctor who assists in the 
death of the patient “need only show that he or she believed that the 
patient endured some sort of unspecified suffering.”106 
 Switzerland provides another striking example of the impact that 
autonomy-based arguments have in breaking down legal restrictions to 
assisted suicide: in 2006, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court ruled that 
assisted suicide should be available to individuals with mental illness 
and psychiatric disorders, so long as they were capable of making a “ra-
tional” and “well-considered” decision.107 In that case, the plaintiff, a 
manic depressive, based his argument on his Article 8(1) right to self-
determination.108 In its decision, the court reasoned that serious men-
tal disorders “could make life seem as unbearable to some patients as 
serious somatic ailments do to others” and that those individuals should 
have just as much of a right to end their lives.109 
 Thus, in light of recent developments in other jurisdictions that 
accord deference to autonomy-based arguments, there is a high poten-
                                                                                                                      
lated that, given the court’s rationale that placed greater weight on the principle of auton-
omy, the requirement of any form of unbearable suffering was “on the way out.” Gorsuch, 
supra note 91, at 105; Griffiths et al., supra note 24, at 153. Writing in 1998, Griffiths 
predicted that Chabot might eventually come to be seen as paving the way to a legal devel-
opment which accepts assistance in the suicides of persons who are simply “tired of life” or 
those who “are not suffering at the time the request is made but, in anticipation of future 
deterioration, want to be in a position to choose the time of their death.” See Griffiths et 
al., supra note 24, at 153. Griffiths noted that such situations were not inevitable, but the 
Chabot decision had granted sufficient weight to arguments stemming from notions of 
autonomy to make them plausible. See id. 
105 Gorsuch, supra note 91, at 106. Doctors must also inform patients about their situ-
ation and prospects for recovery, and consult with another physician who has seen the 
patient. Id. Finally, the doctor and the patient must hold “the conviction that there was no 
other reasonable solution for the situation [the patient] was in.” Id. 
106 Id. 
107 See Jacob M. Appel, A Suicide Right for the Mentally Ill? A Swiss Case Opens a New Debate, 
37 Hastings Ctr. Rep., 21, 21 (2007). 
108 See id. 
109 See id. In the wake of this decision, at least one scholar has concluded that the 
court’s opinion, however jarring, is theoretically consistent with the idea of respect for 
personal autonomy upon which the assisted suicide movement is built. See id. at 22. 
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tial that in the post-Purdy age, the United Kingdom will begin its slide 
down the slope towards more permissive assisted suicide laws.110 
Conclusion 
 The Purdy court’s reasoning that grounds the decision to commit 
suicide under the umbrella of privacy rights is a significant step toward 
the gradual liberalization of assisted suicide laws in the United King-
dom, especially because restrictions on assisted suicide have proven dif-
ficult to uphold in other jurisdictions once autonomy-based arguments 
are invoked to challenge them. Purdy v. DPP has not by itself blown 
open the door for the legalization of assistance in suicide on-demand 
because the Suicide Act remains valid law in the United Kingdom and 
the DPP’s guidelines technically do not grant anyone immunity from 
prosecution. Nevertheless, a legal regime that accepts the principle that 
self-determination grants one the right to avoid what he or she consid-
ers to be an undignified end to his or her life by its own logic invites 
challenges to any sort of restrictions that would appear to limit the 
right to assisted suicide to those who suffer from a small subset of seri-
ous physical ailments. If personal autonomy persists as the sole ration-
ale for recognizing the right to make decisions regarding the manner 
of one’s own death, it is only a matter of time before “death-on-
demand” is available to all U.K. citizens, irrespective of their level of 
suffering. 
                                                                                                                      
110 See Gorsuch, supra note 91, at 97−98; Paterson, supra note 102, at 176−77. See also 
Wesley J. Smith, Death on Demand: The Assisted Suicide Movement Sheds Its Fig Leaf, Weekly 
Standard, July 5, 2007, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/ 
000/013/831mhugn.asp. Smith uses the term “death-on-demand” in a 2007 piece in which 
he argues that the right-to-die movement is really about extending the right to assisted 
suicide to all rational persons, regardless of whether they are terminally ill. See id. Smith 
also uses evidence from several jurisdictions to demonstrate that “nearly every jurisdiction 
that has legalized assisted suicide for the seriously ill—as well as those that have refused to 
meaningfully enforce anti-assisted suicide laws—has either formally expanded the legal 
right to die to those suffering existentially, or shrugged in the face of illegal assisted sui-
cides of the depressed.” See id. 
